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ABSTRACT—Social cognition refers to the mental repre-
sentations and processes that underlie social judgments
and behavior—for example, the application of stereotypes
to members of social groups. Theories of social cognition
have generally assumed that mental representations are
abstract and stable and that they are activated and applied
by relatively automatic, context-independent processes.
Recent evidence is inconsistent with these expectations,
however. Social-cognitive processes have been shown to
be adaptive to the perceiver’s current social goals, commu-
nicative contexts, and bodily states. Although these find-
ings can often be given ad hoc explanations within current
conceptual frameworks, they invite a fuller integration
with the broad intellectual movement emphasizing situated
cognition. Such an approach has already been influential
in many areas within psychology and beyond, and theories
in the field of social cognition would benefit by taking
advantage of its insights.
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The study of social cognition is the subfield of social psychology
concerned with understanding the mental representations and
processes that contribute to human social judgments and social
behavior—the ways people perceive and evaluate other people
and social groups and act toward them. Like most scientific
fields that owe much to the ‘‘cognitive revolution’’ of the 1960s
and ’70s, the field of social cognition relied heavily on theories
that describe perceivers as constructing, activating, and ap-
plying abstract symbolic representations (schemas, prototypes,
etc.). In this article, we describe that viewpoint, as well as some
recent empirical findings that call it into question, in topic areas
that have been at the center of empirical and theoretical work
in social cognition. We then consider some larger theoretical
implications of those findings.
Theories emphasizing abstract representations are exempli-
fied by mainstream work on stereotypes, which are defined as a
perceiver’s beliefs about the general characteristics of a social
group (e.g., the belief that women are emotional and unasser-
tive). Like any schematic knowledge structure, stereotypes have
two functions: (a) to summarize the perceiver’s existing knowl-
edge about the social group (obtained through social learning
from others or through direct encounters with the stereotyped
group) and (b) to shape interpretations of new information and
inform judgments about members of the group when they are
encountered in the future. Until perhaps a decade ago, research
emphasized the stability of such representations—that is, that
stereotypes, once learned, are hard to change even when the
perceiver encounters information that would challenge them.
The observed stability even motivated entire lines of research
examining the processes responsible for it (e.g., ‘‘subtyping’’ of
stereotype-disconfirming group members so that they have little
impact on the stereotype representation). Research also estab-
lished that stereotypes can be activated and applied in a
relatively automatic fashionwhen a perceivermerely encounters
a member of a stereotyped group. Importantly, this process oc-
curs even if the perceiver does not consciously endorse or wish to
use the stereotype—a common occurrence in today’s world,
where the use of stereotypes is often socially condemned. This
point is demonstrated by studies showing stereotype effects on
implicit measures, such asmeasures that rely onmeasurement of
response times in priming paradigms (see Fazio & Olson, 2003).
Implicit measures, in contrast to rating scales or other explicit
self-reports, tap relatively automatic processes and make it
difficult for perceivers to voluntarily control their responses.
As of a decade or so ago, most researchers would have agreed
that symbolic representations such as stereotypes are abstract,
stable, and general knowledge structures (or schemas); that they
are activated automatically and independent of the perceiver’s
goals, upon the mere categorization of an appropriate social-
stimulus person; and that their activation makes their content
available and likely to influence the perceiver’s judgments and
actions, even against the perceiver’s wishes.
In contrast to that view, more recent evidence suggests that
stereotypes’ effects on social judgments and social behaviors
are extremely malleable and sensitive to details of current social
situations. After illustrating this point, we will discuss its
broader theoretical implications. Our argument is threefold:
(a) The existing literature generally provides specific, ad hoc
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explanations for these contextual effects rather than treating
them as an integral part of theory; (b) context sensitivity can best
be explained by powerful, integrative principles deriving from
the ‘‘situated cognition’’ approach; and (c) these principles,
when fleshed out in terms of their applicability to social cogni-
tion, will facilitate further theoretical and empirical progress in
social-cognition research.
SITUATIONAL CONTEXTS AND SOCIAL COGNITION
For cognition to be adaptive, concepts must be used in different
ways in different situations. Thus, another way of looking at
stereotypes is that they flexibly reflect a perceiver’s current so-
cial motives and relationships with others in the situation rather
than representing abstract and stable schemas. Consider
someone who is a member of two social groups with widely
differing stereotypes, such as an African American (stereotyped
as poor and unintelligent) physician (affluent, intelligent). If a
social perceiver is praised by such a person, features of the
positive stereotype are automatically activated, while the neg-
ative stereotype is suppressed. In contrast, if the perceiver is
criticized by that person, it will trigger activation of the negative
stereotype rather than the positive one (Sinclair&Kunda, 1999).
These effects, which are observed on implicit measures, do not
occur when a perceiver simply observes the target person
praising or criticizing someone else. Thus, the effects appear to
arise because the perceiver’s motive to believe praise and dis-
parage criticism acts as a constraint that influences fundamental
processes of stereotyping.
Not only the perceiver’s current motives but other contextual
variables affect the activation and use of stereotypes. One thing
that matters is the perceiver’s emotional state: Implicit measures
show that, when a person is angry for an irrelevant reason,
negative stereotypes will be more readily applied to out-group
members than when that person is in a neutral or happy state
(DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004). Incidental ex-
posure to positive or negative exemplars of a social group, in
a task-irrelevant context, also influences stereotype-relevant
judgments about that social group. For example, exposure
to liked African Americans (such as Michael Jordan), com-
pared to disliked Black criminals, makes White students more
favorable toward affirmative action programs (Bodenhausen,
Schwarz, Bless, & Waenke, 1995). This occurs even though
one might plausibly reason that Michael Jordan’s example
demonstrates that even members of a disadvantaged group can
attain economic success, diminishing the perceived need for
affirmative action.
COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL COGNITION
The adaptiveness of cognition to current situations is particu-
larly evident in regard to the social situation, including com-
municative relationships between the perceiver and others.
Communicative relevance has recently been shown to moderate
the well-known tendency to enhance in-group identity and
derogate out-group identity through systematic differences in
language use when describing positive or negative behaviors of
in-group and out-group members. The so-called linguistic in-
tergroup bias (Maass, 1999) effect is that, when describing
positive in-group behaviors, people tend to use abstract con-
cepts (e.g., adjectives) to imply that such behaviors are enduring
characteristics of in-groupmembers. So if John assists an elderly
woman across the street, a member of John’s in-group might say
‘‘John is helpful.’’ Abstract terms are similarly used to describe
negative behaviors of out-group members. In contrast, people
minimize the diagnostic significance of negative in-group be-
haviors (and positive out-group behaviors) by describing these
with concrete, highly specific terms. An out-group member
might say, ‘‘John walked across the street with the woman.’’ This
influential theory assumes tacitly that the linguistic bias
depends on autonomous inner processes, independent of com-
municative context.
In a situated view, giving a description of a positive or negative
behavior is only adaptive and meaningful if it serves a commu-
nicative function. To test this idea, Semin, de Montes, and
Valencia (2003) examined perceivers’ written descriptions of
other individuals’ behavior in different communicative contexts.
Systematic variations in the linguistic properties of messages
were only found when participants expected their descriptions
to have a communicative function—that is, when they expected
that their descriptions would be read by the person whose be-
havior was being described. In another condition in which par-
ticipants believed that their descriptions would never be read by
anyone, the bias was not found. This finding contradicts the idea
that the linguistic bias flows from autonomous, invariant cog-
nitive processes, replacing it with the insight that communica-
tive function determines the nature of those processes. An
important feature of a socially situated cognition approach is that
it invites researchers to specify not only psychological processes
and their effects but also their boundaries. If certain responses
do not serve a function, then the processes leading to them will
not be activated.
Communicative contexts affect many types of social-cognitive
processes. One oft-studied effect is that social perceivers tend to
explain other people’s behavior in terms of those people’s inner
personality characteristics, desires, or beliefs rather than in
terms of the demands of social situations. This tendency has
been viewed as automatic, fundamental, and linked to the
properties of abstract mental processes. However, using themost
minimal of cues—a letterhead that read either ‘‘Institute for
Social Research’’ or ‘‘Institute of Personality Research’’—to
signal the nature of the audience for participants’ questionnaire
responses, Norenzayan and Schwarz (1999) demonstrated the
susceptibility of this supposedly fundamental and automatic
attribution processes to contextual influences. Participants were
asked to report their causal explanations for a mass murder
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based on a newspaper report. Their explanations were more
situational and less dispositional if the letterhead introducing
the questionnaire read ‘‘Institute for Social Research.’’ In con-
trast, the ‘‘Institute of Personality Research’’ letterhead resulted
in more dispositional causes being given. Norenzayan and
Schwarz (1999) suggest that their subtle manipulation of the
communicative context influenced participants’ perceptions of
what was epistemically relevant to the researchers.
Yet another compelling illustration of the effects of commu-
nicative contexts on cognition comes from studies by Higgins
and Rholes (1978). In these studies, speakers were motivated to
present themselves positively to listeners. This interdependence
between communicator and recipient influenced not only the
message that communicators presented but also their private
beliefs. Communicators distorted their messages to make them
consistent with their audiences’ attitudes. Moreover, the biased
content of their messages affected communicators’ own beliefs,
when measured with a questionnaire after a delay. The issue of
how the relationship between speaker and audience regulates
the properties of messages, or audience design, has been elab-
orated in diverse research. While cooperative relationships lead
to messages converging with the views of the audience, com-
petitive or adversarial relationships are likely to lead to diver-
gence. Research on audience design and on communicative
contexts in general supports the adaptive, situated view of
cognition.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
As the above examples show, recent research has amply docu-
mented the situation specificity and flexibility of many types of
social-cognitive processes. Yet in many cases, context sensi-
tivity has been regarded as a kind of noise, as an inessential
distraction—even a barrier—to the study of the hypothesized
invariant representations considered by many researchers to be
the most fundamental causes of social judgment and social be-
havior. As a result, context sensitivity has often been explained
(if at all) with unintegrated theoretical ‘‘add-ons’’—secondary,
often paradigm-specific processes that merely moderate the
mental processes of fundamental interest. For example, the
context sensitivity of stereotypes has often been thought to
reflect participants’ intentional shaping of their responses to
avoid revealing socially undesirable stereotypic or prejudiced
thoughts (Fazio & Olson, 2003). This explanation has recently
lost much of its appeal in the face of evidence that (a) even
implicitly measured stereotypes, less subject to intentional
response biases, are highly context sensitive (Blair, 2002) and
that (b) nonsocial concepts, for which social-desirability con-
cerns are not an issue, are also context sensitive (Yeh &
Barsalou, 2006).
More progress might be made with a theoretical approach that
makes interdependence and mutual constraint between person
and context a central focus rather than a mere distraction from
the inner representations and processes assumed to be of pri-
mary interest. In our view, the most promising approach is that of
situated cognition (Clark, 1997). This movement has been in-
fluential across many areas of psychology and the cognitive and
social sciences in general, but it has had relatively little impact
within social psychology. Yet, as we have argued (Smith &
Semin, 2004), its major themes offer a number of points of
contact and similarity with the enduring concerns of social
psychology. Situated cognition offers not only a powerful and
fundamental critique of the idea that cognition is simply ab-
stract, amodal information processing, but also a number of more
positive principles and points of focus. We suggest three broad
principles as desiderata for theoretical integration and progress
in social-cognition research.
First, we urge theorists to avoid the language and metaphor
of the ‘‘storage’’ and ‘‘retrieval’’ of representations, which imply
that representations are static, inert ‘‘things,’’ and to instead
conceptualize representations as states that are constructed
online in specific contexts. Human cognitive systems produce
situated versions of concepts that have context-specific func-
tions rather than activating the same, context-independent
configuration in every situation (Yeh & Barsalou, 2006).
Second, researchers should acknowledge that adaptive cog-
nition involves perceptual–motor loops that pass through the
environment (Clark, 1997) rather than being mostly imple-
mented by autonomous inner processes. Strong support for this
principle comes from recent work placing sensory and motor
information at the heart of both conceptual representations
in general (Barsalou, 1999) and particular social-cognitive pro-
cesses like understanding other people (Semin, 2007). For ex-
ample, the recent discovery of mirror-neuron systems in the
brain suggests that we use our bodies—covertly in the form of
activity in motor cortex, or overtly in bodily movements—in the
process of understanding other people’s actions and emotions.
Third, theory should reflect the ways that cognition is socially
enabled and distributed through communication (Hutchins,
1995). Communication fundamentally shapes and even consti-
tutes cognition, making cognition truly social. Many tasks, such
as performing heart surgery or navigating a large ship, supersede
the capabilities of an individual and require the collaborative
operation of a group that has a shared reality facilitating the
coordination of its actions. In such situations, cognition is to
be found in collaborative communication rather than in any one
single individual’s head. Cognitive processes draw not only
on resources in the social environment but also on technical
equipment (monitors, readouts, maps, etc.) into which consid-
erable knowledge is downloaded. Tasks such as these involve
truly social cognition, extended beyond the individual through
environmental scaffolds, both social and nonsocial.
The theme that cognition is situated—not isolated in inner
representations and processes but causally interdependent
with the current physical and social environment—resonates
with findings, such as those outlined in this article, that
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situations and communicative contexts pervasively influence
social thought and action. This suggests that the situated-cog-
nition approach may ultimately provide general explanatory
principles that can take us beyond the ad hoc explanations often
offered for such findings. Situated cognition is not yet a unified
theoretical framework by any means, but it is an approach that
offers general principles and emphases that cut broadly across
many scientific disciplines. We believe that social-psychologi-
cal findings demonstrating the adaptiveness, context sensitivity,
and socially situated nature of social cognition can find satis-
fying and integrative explanations within such an approach.
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